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Abstract 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is considered as an important instrument for 
economic development all over the world.  As a result, a growing competition for FDI 
among the majority of all countries has reached to high level. The aim of this paper is 
to examine the FDI inflows determinants for 24 OECD countries i.e. Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.  To this end we employ 
annual data from 1980 to 2012 for a series of potential FDI determinants that have 
been identified as the most important by the relevant literature. Our empirical strategy 
employs both the standard fixed effects panel as well as a dynamic panel approach. 
The empirical findings highlight the importance of market size, trade openness, unit 
labor cost, schooling, taxation, gross capital formation, institutional variables, and 
ROA/ROE as significant FDI determinants. In the case of the dynamic panel model 
those FDI inflows determinants are not uniform for all country groups. Additionally, 
the results indicate that corporate tax rates clearly affect FDI attractiveness. This 
finding is robust when testing different countries subgroups. The present study has 
important policy implications indicating the factors that host economies should place 
emphasis on in order to attract FDI inflows. Policy makers should not only pay 
attention to the corporate tax rate level but they should also design a simple, stable 
and transparent taxation system that minimizes the relevant business risk. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted research interest because of its potential 
positive economic impact on the host countries’ economies. Even though there is no 
agreement regarding growth benefits, several studies have emphasized the positive 
impact of FDI on economic growth through employment, acquired knowledge and 
management skills, as well as technology spillovers (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; 
Kim et al., 2003; Johnson, 2006; Busse and Groizard, 2008; KrifaSchneider and 
Matei, 2010; Walsh and Yu, 2010; Alfaro et al., 2010). In the wake of the global 
financial crisis and several regional fiscal crises, attracting FDI in order to foster 
economic activity has become a priority for many countries facing financing and 
market liquidity problems.  
A growing strand of literature has been trying to determine FDI attractiveness factors 
studying different country groups. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries usually attract research interest since traditionally 
they have been representing an outstanding share of the world FDI inflows, reaching 
on average almost 76% of the total FDI inflows for the period 1990–1999 and 70% 
for the period 2000–2009. 
FDI is a key element to the recovery for the Greek economy.  Its imperative 
importance steams first from the fact that the country cannot continue borrowing 
money from the European Union countries, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund without making significant progress in attracting foreign 
investors. Secondly, Greece may be able to exit the bailout programme established by 
international authorities as soon as this year, which makes the need for growth via 
investment an especially important issue for the country future in a post-memorandum 
era. For this reason, the investigation of the factors that influence the FDI growth in 
Greece is crucial for supervisory authorities to implement the policies and to design 
the measures required to attract and encourage FDI. 
This paper extends the existing literature regarding FDI inflow determinants in OECD 
and developing countries in several ways. First of all, previous studies regarding 
OECD countries have examined only a small number of countries.
1
 In this study we 
                                                          
1
 For example, the most recent previous studies focus on a limited number of OECD countries: Alam 
and Shah (2013) examined a 10-OECD country sample from 1985 to 2009 and Gedik (2013) examined 
11 OECD countries from 1995 to 2008. 
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extend previous research having a sample of 24 OECD countries. To this end we 
employ annual data for the period 1980–2012 using a panel data approach in both a 
fixed effect and a dynamic framework. We also examine a series of potential FDI 
determinants that have been identified as the most important by the relevant literature. 
These include the market size, trade openness, labor cost, as well as human capital 
using school enrolment on secondary education as an appropriate proxy. Moreover, 
we test for the impact of market instability proxied by inflation as well as for the 
impact of the share of gross capital formation on FDI inflows. A series of institutional 
variables is also employed and we examine the impact of profitability ratios (return on 
assets and return on equity) based on the benchmark stock market indices on a 
country's FDI attractiveness. Finally, we compare the results of the individual country 
groups under examination, since different factors may attract FDI in different 
countries. 
The empirical findings demonstrate that market size, trade openness, unit labor cost, 
schooling, taxation, gross capital formation, institutional variables, and ROA/ROE are 
significant FDI determinants. When the dynamic panel model is employed it is 
revealed that FDI inflows determinants are not uniform for all country groups. 
However, market size and corporate taxation rates are particularly robust FDI 
determinants. Based on the dynamic panel approach for the 5 European countries that 
faced fiscal imbalances (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal Spain), lagged FDI, market 
size, unit labor cost, taxation and regulatory quality significantly affect FDI inflows.  
The analysis enables us to extract inferences with important policy implications 
regarding the factors that host economies should pay attention in order to boost the 
attractiveness of FDI inflows. It is revealed that apart from market size, corporate tax 
rates clearly affect FDI attractiveness. This finding is robust when testing different 
countries subgroups and indicates the need for investor friendlier taxation schemes. 
That said, supervisory authorities should not only pay attention to the corporate tax 
rate level but they should also design a simple, stable and transparent taxation system 
that minimizes the relevant business risk.  
 
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows.  First, the relevant literature 
is reviewed. Second, the presentation of the model is analyzed.  Next, the employed 
data for the estimation of the model follows.  Then, an assessment of the empirical 
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results are presented. Finally, some conclusions and policy implications from the 
econometric investigation are drawn.  
 
2. Literature Review 
  
Several studies have tried to capture the factors that determine a country’s FDI 
attractiveness. FDI can be either market-oriented or export-oriented. Market-oriented 
FDI mostly focuses on market size and growth, whereas export-oriented FDI mostly 
focuses on cost competitiveness of the host country, while there are also factors that 
affect both types of FDI (OECD, 2000). The well-known O–L–I eclectic paradigm of 
Dunning
2
 identifies ownership, location and internalization advantages that determine 
a host country’s FDI attractiveness.  
Previous research, trying to identify the most important macroeconomic factors that 
affect FDI inflows, has clearly stated the importance of the size of the host economy 
that is usually captured by the relevant GDP per capita (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). 
Market size can attract horizontal FDI when investing firms want to capture a 
domestic market share (Arbatli, 2011). In the same spirit, growth prospects, market 
stability and inflation levels may also influence FDI decisions (Krifa-Schneider and 
Matei, 2010; Arbatli, 2011). Market instability expressed by high inflation and the 
associated political/country risk are also negatively related to FDI Inflows (Krifa-
Schneider and Matei, 2010; Walch and Worz, 2012).  
Trade openness, which is usually defined as exports plus imports as a percentage of 
GDP, has also been considered as an important factor affecting FDI inflows. Several 
studies (Janicki and Wunnava, 2004; Krifa-Schneider and Matei, 2010; Masron and 
Abdullah, 2010) confirm a positive relationship indicating that established trading 
links and international trade growth potential significantly affect FDI inflows, while 
others provide insignificant results (Walsh and Yu, 2010, etc.). Moreover, joining 
international trade agreements can be of particular importance for developing counties 
(Buthe and Milner, 2008).  
Labor cost has also been identified as one of the most important FDI determinants 
(Bevan and Estrin, 2004). This factor can be associated with vertical or export-
oriented FDI. However, relatively low labor costs alone are not necessarily associated 
with increased FDI inflows, especially when knowledge and expertise is needed for 
                                                          
2
  See Dunning (2001) for a detailed presentation of the origins and the evolution of the O-L–I eclectic paradigm 
since the mid-1950s. 
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specialized production or services. In that case, human capital and labor quality (Iwai 
and Thompson, 2012; Agiomirgianakis et al., 2003) as well as research and 
development expenditure (Thompson, 2001) can be of particular importance. 
Corporate taxation has been identified as another important factor and possible source 
of additional business risk (Cassou, 1997; Bloningen, 2005; Krifa-Schneider and 
Matei, 2010; Arbatli, 2011). As a result, providing tax incentives has proved to be 
beneficial for several countries’ FDI attractiveness, e.g. Ireland. However, other 
issues, such as double taxation treatment or different FDI sensitivity to taxes of 
certain types of FDI should also be considered (Hartman, 1984; Bloningen, 2005).  
Previous literature has also stressed the importance of institutional factors, such as 
regulatory quality, corruption control, etc., as well as economic sentiment or 
investment climate indicators that may also affect FDI inflows (Bloningen, 2005; 
Benassy-Quere et al., 2007; Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007; Arbatli, 
2011). It has to be mentioned though that, according to Bloningen (2005), it is 
difficult to obtain accurate estimations of the magnitude of the effect of institutional 
factors owing to the lack of accurate measurements. As a result empirical results can 
be contradictory. Moreover, different studies focus on different measurements of 
institutions based on data availability and the relevant results are not always 
comparable. An interesting approach has been put forward by Jayasuriya (2011) 
employing the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” rankings as an institutional 
variable that captures business regulation. The author examined 84 countries from 
2006 to 2009 and identified a statistically significant positive relationship between the 
Ease of Doing Business Index and FDI inflows, while this result does not hold for 
developing countries alone.  
The potential impact of all these factors has been tested for several country groups 
that display different characteristics in terms of economic development and market 
size. OECD countries have attracted research interest. Among the first studies that 
examined OECD countries, Agiomirgianakis et al. (2003) provided robust evidence of 
the positive impact of human capital, trade openness and infrastructure density on FDI 
inflows, testing for 20 OECD countries from 1975 to 1997. Recently, Alam and Shah 
(2013) identified market size, labor cost and infrastructure quality to be significant 
FDI determinants for 10 OECD countries for the period 1985–2009. The authors also 
tested a series of potential determinants that provided insignificant results for the 
sample under examination, including labor productivity, corporate tax rates, trade 
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openness, political stability, inflation and real effective exchange rate. Finally, Gedik 
(2013) also examined a series of economic, fiscal and institutional factors for 11 
OECD countries from 1995 to 2008. The author identified taxation, economic 
instability and labor cost to have a negative and significant impact on FDI. Moreover, 
political and institutional stability were proved to be of particular importance to 
attract FDI. 
 
3. Methodology 
The standard methodology employed in relevant studies is based on the estimation of 
a fixed effects panel model for the countries under examination. In our case the fixed 
effects panel model used in order to examine the FDI inflows determinants is 
structured as follows: 
FDIit  = ai +  β1 GDPit + β2 ΤΟt + β3 ULCit + β4 SCHit + β5 Ζit + eit (1) 
i=l,...,N,t=l,...,T 
where FDIit stands for FDI inward flows, GDPit for GDP per capita
3
 , TOt for trade 
openness, ULCit for unit labor cost, SCHit for school enrollment and eit is the error 
term over time t. We also test for the impact of several additional Zit variables 
including inflation, share of gross capital formation
4
, corporate tax rates, several 
institutional variables as well as return on assets and return on equity ratios. 
However, recent literature has highlighted the fact that the relationship under 
examination can be better explained using dynamic panel data models.
5
 To this end 
we also employ the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel model that 
accounts for serial correlation and endogeneity. In this case the model is structured as 
follows: 
                                                          
3
 The log values of the variables FDI inward flows and GDP per capita are employed. 
 
4
 According to the definition provided by Data-Planet by the Conquest Systems, Inc. (2013), the share 
of gross capital formation (at current PPPs) "reports the share of output-based real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita that is represented by capital formation (investment), at current purchasing 
power parities (PPPs). Output-side real GDP allows comparison of productive capacity across countries 
and over time." 
 
5
 See Carstensen and Toubal (2004), Alguacil et al. (2008), Kirfa-Schneider and Matei (2010), 
Grubaugh(2013). 
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FDIit  = ai +  β1 FDIit-1  + β2 GDPit + β3 ΤΟit + β4 ULCit + β5 SCHit + β6 Ζit + eit (2) 
i=l,...,N,t=l,...,T 
 
where αi is a vector of m individual effects, eit is a multivariate white-noise vector of 
residuals and all other variables are already defined. 
In order to test for the robustness of our results for different country subgroups we 
divide our sample into three categories based on the average FDI inflows of the period 
under examination i.e. high, medium and low average FDI inflows countries. This 
categorisation enables us to identify whether countries of different FDI attraction 
levels (based on their relative rank) are actually affected by different determinants. 
Finally, another subgroup of particular interest is examined including Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. These countries were confronted with severe fiscal 
imbalances and recession. As a result, attracting FDI inflows in productive sectors 
could accelerate their economic recovery. 
Overall, our research hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
H1: one lagged FDI inflows, market size, trade openness, school enrollment, gross 
capital formation, institutional variables and profitability ratios are expected to have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. 
H2: unit labor cost, inflation and high corporate tax rates are expected to have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. 
H3: FDI determinants may considerably differ when testing for different country sub-
groups. 
 
4.  Data 
In this paper we examine the FDI inflows determinants for 24 OECD countries, i.e. 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States, using annual 
data for the period 1980-2012. Data for FDI inflows and inflation were derived from 
the UNCTAD database. Data for market size (using GDP per capita as a proxy), trade 
openness (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP) and school enrollment 
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(secondary, % gross) were derived from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators. Labor cost (unit labor cost index) and corporate taxes (central government 
corporate income tax rate) were derived from the OECD statistics. Moreover, the 
share of gross capital formation was obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT) 
database (version 8.0)
6
, while institutional variables, including voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, from the OECD Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Finally, return on assets and return on equity ratios of the 
benchmark stock market indices were obtained from Bloomberg. 
 
5. Empirical results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics of the whole countries sample and the 
individual subgroups under examination. Table 3 reports the fixed effects panel 
estimations for the 24 OECD countries under examination for different model 
specifications. The empirical results in the first column present the estimated 
coefficients for the basic model of equation (1). The results indicate a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between FDI inward flows and market size, trade 
openness and schooling. Moreover a negative statistically significant relationship is 
identified relative to the unit labor cost. These results completely confirm our initial 
hypotheses, being also consistent with previous studies (i.e., Bevan and Estrin, 2004; 
Arbatli, 2011; Janicki and Wunnava, 2004; Krifa-Schneider and Matei, 2010; Masron 
and Abdullah, 2010; Nourzad et al., 2014; Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007; 
Agiomirgianakis et al., 2004). 
 
Each one of the rest of the columns of Table 3 presents an alternative augmented 
version of the basic model using fixed effects panel estimations, in order to test for 
additional FDI determinants.
7
 According to the results, inflation does not have a 
                                                          
6 Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R. and Timmer, M.P. (2013). The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, available 
for download at www, ggdc.net/pwt. 
 
7
 It has to be mentioned that due to data availability there is no point having a single multifactor model with all 
potential determinants since this specification would significantly reduce the number of observations. For example, 
data for institutional variables are available since 1996. 
We initially tested all individual institutional variables in order to identify the ones that display statistically 
significant results and we concluded in the specific variables set presented in the paper. Moreover, we also 
employed the sum of the individual institutional variables in the final model specification in order to test for their 
possible combined positive effect of these institutional variables. 
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statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. However, gross capital formation, 
corporate taxation, institutional variables and return on assets / equity (ROA and 
ROE) display statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign. In particular, 
FDI inflows are negatively affected by high corporate taxation, while gross capital 
formation (a measure of productive capacity) and favorable institutional variables, 
such as political stability and absence of violence and regulatory quality could 
increase the FDI attractiveness of the host countries. Finally, foreign direct investors 
pay attention to profitability ratios, such as ROA and ROE, as expected. Interestingly, 
to the best of our knowledge, these profitability factors have not been previously 
analyzed. 
The results reported in the Table 4 based on the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
dynamic panel estimations using robust standard errors confirm the dynamic nature of 
FDI inflows. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between FDI 
inflows and the one lagged FDI inflows. Market size, corporate tax rates as well as 
return on equity also display statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign, 
consistent to previous literature (i.e.,  Cassou, 1997; Bloningen, 2005; Krifa-
Schneider and Matei, 2010; Arbatli, 2011) while the rest of the variables do not 
provide significant results. 
Moreover, it is of particular interest to examine whether different country groups 
display different relationships. To this end we divided our sample into three groups 
based on their average FDI inflows for the period 1980-2012. Regarding the first 
subgroup, the high average FDI inflows countries results presented in the Table 5, 
there are some interesting findings that differ from the whole sample estimations. 
Apart from the positive and statistically significant coefficients of the lagged FDI, the 
market size, the gross capital formation and the ROE, we identify a negative 
statistically significant relationship with the unit labor cost and the inflation. 
Furthermore, the relevant coefficients of the corporate tax rate and institutions display 
statistically significant relationships but in the opposite direction than expected. 
As far as the second subgroup is concerned (Table 6), the medium average FDI 
inflows countries results presented in the Table 3 also indicate the dynamic nature of 
FDI inflows as well as the positive impact of market size and gross capital formation. 
The negative impact of high corporate taxation is also confirmed. 
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The low average FDI inflows countries results (Table 7) also display positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the lagged FDI. Furthermore, the results 
indicate the negative impact of inflation and corporate tax rates. It is worth 
mentioning though that for the most of the specifications employed for this group, 
market size is not a significant factor. 
Finally, another group of countries of particular interest includes Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. These five countries have attracted international research 
interest due to the severe fiscal imbalances and the crises they experienced. A recent 
relevant study by Economou and Hassapis (2013) examined the FDI inflows 
determinants of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain under a different model 
specification providing comparative results. Table 8 reports the dynamic panel results 
for this subgroup. In this case, lagged FDI inflows, market size as well as regulatory 
quality positively affect FDI attractiveness. On the other hand, unit labor cost and 
corporate taxation negatively affect FDI inflows for this subgroup. These results are 
consistent with the ones reported by the relevant recent study of Economou and 
Hassapis (2013). Surprisingly, ROA/ROE coefficient displays a negative statistically 
significant sign. However this unexpected finding could be attributed to the small 
number of observations for this particular variable. 
 
6. The case of Greece 
 
In this section we focus on the case of Greece with an emphasis on policies that can 
increase FDI. The adhesion of Greece to the EEC in 1981 increased the expectations 
to attract FDJ in the country. However, these expectations were not validated. For the 
size of Greece, FDI are low because in occupies the last twenty positions in a list of 
hundred and forty one countries. The low inflow of FDI in Greece is due to the 
complicated tax systems and its continuous changes, the bureaucratic system and the 
corruption of the public sector in Greece, mainly the reinvestment of subsidiaries 
companies. The majority of companies aim at increasing their sales rather in the 
domestic market rather than in exports, although the internal market is relatively 
small. It should be noted that Greece does not attract investment labour intensive as it 
was the case in the past. The multinationals give emphasis in the horizontal 
organization of R and D, which implies tha the country has high level of personnel. 
Finally, Greece lacks of long-run policy regarding the attractiveness of FDI.  We 
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have estimated a number of alternative specifications, both static and 
dynamic and for a number of subsets of countries. The question is how we 
can “specialize” these estimates to the case of Greece. To do that, we re-
estimate the equation corresponding to Table 4 assuming random coefficients 
for each country and a prior that is centered around the Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond DPD estimates with standard deviation given by twice 
the estimated DPD standard error of each estimate. 
Our estimation is based on Bayesian techniques using the Gibbs sampler with 15,000 
iterations, omitting the first 5,000 to mitigate the impact of start – up effects. In Table 
4a we report posterior means and posterior s.d. for all countries in the sample and in 
Table 4b we report the results for Greece. 
We include, in addition, two dynamic common factors: 
 
i) An overall global factor, 
G
t
F
. 
ii) A factor for Southern European countries,  
SE
t
F
. 
iii) A factor, 
*
t
F
, representing interdependence.  
The global factor is 
 1
.G G G G G
t t t
F Fa b e
-
= + +
  
The southern European factor follows a similar process: 
 1
.SE SE SE SE SE
t t t
F Fa b e
-
= + +
  
The interdependence factor is more complicated. 
 
* * * * *
, 1 ,1
, 1, ..., ,
n
it i i i t ij ij t itj
F F w D i na b e
- =
= + + + =å
  
where, for each country, ij
w
 is an unknown weight, 1
0, 1
n
ij ijj
w w
=
³ =å
 and ,ij t
D
 is 
a measure of interdependence of countries i  and j . The interdependence measure is 
defined as the (generalized) impulse response function obtained from a bivariate 
Vector Autoregression with two lags between the FDIs allowing for an exogenous 
variable which is the first principal component of GDP per capita.  
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the FDI inflows determinants in 24 OECD countries using 
the standard fixed effects panel as well as a dynamic panel approach. The first set of 
empirical results indicates market size, trade openness, unit labor cost, schooling, 
taxation, gross capital formation, institutional variables, and ROA/ROE as significant 
FDI determinants, consistent to our research hypotheses. 
It has to be mentioned though that when employing the dynamic panel model, it is 
clearly demonstrated that FDI inflows determinants are not uniform for all country 
groups. However, market size and corporate taxation rates are particularly robust FDI 
determinants. Based on the dynamic panel approach for the 5 European countries that 
faced fiscal imbalances (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal Spain), lagged FDI, market 
size, unit labor cost, taxation and regulatory quality significantly affect FDI inflows. 
Interestingly, in this case the institutional variables do not present the expected impact 
on FDI. However, this can be explained by the relatively small number of available 
observations for these variables. 
The empirical results have important policy implications indicating the factors that 
host economies should place emphasis on in order to attract FDI inflows. Apart from 
market size, corporate tax rates clearly affect FDI attractiveness. This finding is robust 
when testing different countries subgroups and indicates the need for investor 
friendlier taxation schemes. Policy makers should not only pay attention to the 
corporate tax rate level but they should also design a simple, stable and transparent 
taxation system that minimizes the relevant business risk. Future research should also 
focus on the qualitative analysis of the individual countries in order to further analyze 
the country specific factors affecting their FDI attractiveness. Finally, more emphasis 
should be placed on the impact of FDI determinants when testing for different 
industry sectors. 
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Figure 1. World FDI inward flows, (USD millions) (1970-2012) 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the 5 countries subgroup 
 
Whole sample (24 OECD countries)  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI 754 3.5648 0.8853 -0.3528 5.4969  159 3.4404 0.7125 1.7012 4.8864 
GDP 792 4.2711 0.2550 3.3355 4.8172  165 4.2309 0.2230 3.7323 4.6551 
TO 791 0.6629 0.3229 0.1592 1.9241  165 0.6981 0.3792 0.3150 1.9241 
ULC 772 0.7883 0.2895 0.0000 1.4770  165 0.7207 0.2887 0.0631 1.1496 
SCH 700 1.0025 0.1931 0.3585 1.6235  149 0.9683 0.1481 0.5377 1.2852 
INFL 792 0.0759 0.1471 -0.0448 1.3183  165 0.0687 0.0649 -0.0448 0.2878 
CSHI 768 0.2472 0.0491 0.1136 0.5197  160 0.2573 0.0332 0.1322 0.3619 
TAX 711 0.3445 0.0919 0.1250 0.5600  160 0.3602 0.1058 0.1250 0.5320 
INST 312 7.6338 3.3651 -2.6000 11.9200  65 6.0189 2.0967 2.1700 9.5700 
PS 312 0.7737 0.6137 -1.2900 1.6700  65 0.6763 0.4794 -0.3300 1.4900 
RQ 312 1.3086 0.4616 0.0300 2.0800  65 1.1428 0.3490 0.5100 1.9200 
ROA 281 0.0167 0.0195 -0.1296 0.1242  56 0.0105 0.0140 -0.0656 0.0265 
ROE 281 0.1060 0.0884 -0.5742 0.3001  56 0.0979 0.1316 -0.5742 0.2385 
Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP 
(i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts 
for inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST 
counts for the sum of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and 
ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the three sample subgroups based on their relative average FDI inflows ranking 
 
 
High average FDI inflows subgroup 
(United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Canada, Spain and Netherlands) 
 Medium average FDI inflows subgroup 
(Australia, Mexico, Sweden, Italy, Ireland, 
Norway, Turkey and Austria) 
 Low average FDI inflows subgroup 
(Korea, Denmark, Japan, Portugal, Finland, New 
Zealand, Greece and Iceland) 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FDI 257 4.1899 0.6657 2.0935 5.4969  252 3.4999 0.7419 1.2553 4.8149  245 2.9756 0.7893 -0.3528 4.5292 
GDP 264 4.3388 0.1952 3.8343 4.6987  264 4.2208 0.3108 3.3355 4.8172  264 4.2537 0.2311 3.3759 4.6241 
TO 264 0.6982 0.3885 0.1657 1.6901  264 0.6752 0.3471 0.1709 1.9241  263 0.6151 0.1956 0.1592 1.1206 
ULC 259 0.8418 0.1920 0.2648 1.1727  254 0.7301 0.3420 0.0000 1.4770  259 0.7918 0.3045 0.0284 1.4040 
SCH 227 1.0447 0.1448 0.8184 1.6235  235 0.9529 0.2616 0.3585 1.6174  238 1.0112 0.1349 0.5377 1.3183 
INFL 264 0.0348 0.0297 -0.0070 0.1797  264 0.1263 0.2253 -0.0448 1.3183  264 0.0665 0.0952 -0.0135 0.8422 
CSHI 256 0.2299 0.0369 0.1477 0.3619  256 0.2418 0.0442 0.1136 0.3960  256 0.2701 0.0555 0.1191 0.5197 
TAX 256 0.3590 0.0835 0.1500 0.5600  237 0.3408 0.1048 0.1250 0.5500  218 0.3316 0.0841 0.1500 0.5160 
INST 104 8.4150 1.3520 5.1100 11.4600  104 6.4429 4.6144 -2.6000 11.0100  104 8.0437 2.9753 2.1700 11.9200 
PS 104 0.6905 0.4066 -0.3300 1.6600  104 0.6347 0.8360 -1.2900 1.5200  104 0.9958 0.4434 -0.1800 1.6700 
RQ 104 1.4812 0.2593 0.8100 2.0800  104 1.1642 0.5608 0.0300 1.9200  104 1.2804 0.4578 0.3100 2.0200 
ROA 106 0.0138 0.0089 -0.0076 0.0336  88 0.0199 0.0175 -0.0176 0.0949  87 0.0170 0.0284 -0.1296 0.1242 
ROE 106 0.1177 0.0664 -0.0599 0.2953  88 0.1226 0.0766 -0.1914 0.2920  87 0.0749 0.1126 -0.5742 0.3001 
Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP (i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH 
counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, 
INST counts for the sum of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. 
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Table 3. Fixed effects panel data estimations for 24 OECD countries, yearly data 
(1980-2012). 
 
 Basic model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -8.2568*** -8.3094*** -8.9891*** -7.9436*** -5.3260*** -3.9896* -4.3861 -3.6450 
 (-14.43) (-14.39) (-14.89) (-9.77) (-2.54) (-1.75) (-1.43) (-1.18) 
GDPt 2.5504*** 2.5746*** 2.6139*** 2.6821*** 1.7586*** 1.4206** 1.9092** 1.6780** 
 (15.41) (15.22) (15.85) (12.97) (3.34) (2.37) (2.31) (2.01) 
Trade/GDPt 0.7584*** 0.7554*** 0.8423*** 0.4762*** 0.5951* 0.6718* 0.6479 0.6808 
 (4.77) (4.75) (5.29) (2.78) (1.71) (1.93) (1.36) (1.45) 
ULCt -0.3911*** -0.4353*** -0.4227*** -0.6829*** 0.03748 0.1865 -0.2562 -0.1136 
 (-3.25) (-3.19) (-3.53) (-5.02) (0.11) (0.55) (-0.49) (-0.21) 
SCHt 0 7417*** 0.7368*** 0.8037*** 0.6769*** 0.1229 0.1875 -0.2199 -0.1469 
 (4.77) (4.73) (5.19) (4.42) (0.42) (0.64) (-0.75) (-0.50) 
Inflt " -0.1175 
(-0.69) 
" " " " " " 
CSHIt " " 1.4892*** 
(3.54) 
" " " " " 
Taxt " " " -1.0273*** 
(-3.47) 
" " " " 
Instt " " " " 0.1229*** 
(2.77) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " 0.2290* 
(1.81) 
" " 
RQt 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 0.4936*** 
(2.67) 
_
 
_
 
ROAt " " " " " " 2.6917* 
(1.76) 
" 
ROEt " " " " " " " 0.8143** 
(2.35) 
F 353.44 282.62 290.43 241.64 11.48 10.71 7.45 8.03 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 660 660 660 590 264 264 209 209 
Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP 
(i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for 
inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for 
the sum of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE 
count for the return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient 
estimates and their t-statistics in the parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data estimations for 24 OECD countries, 
yearly data (1980-2012). 
 
 Basic model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -2.7516* -2.7912* -3.3095** -3.0749* -3.0201 -1.1244 -6.3693 -6.0037 
 (-1.85) (-1.81) (-2.21) (-1.83) (-0.88) (-0.29) (-1.52) (-1.44) 
FDIt-1 0.3998*** 0.3964*** 0.3902*** 0.3473*** 0.2450* 0.2451* 0.1520 1.1574 
 (3.90) (3.85) (4.16) (4.08) (1.94) (2.00) (1.45) (1.50) 
GDPt 1.1069*** 1.1382*** 1.1268*** 1.3301*** 1.6308* 1.0694 2.6215** 2.4771** 
 (2.67) (2.62) (2.58) (2.89) (1.78) (1.06) (2.45) (2.31) 
Trade/GDPt -0.0270 -0.0224 0.0718 -0.0499 0.0307 -0.0184 -0.6223** -0.6262** 
 (-0.13) (-0.11) (0.37) (-0.25) (0.08) (-0.05) (-2.34) (-2.30) 
ULCt -0.0691 -0.1232 -0.0843 -0.2928 -0.6954 -0.3013 -0.7192 -0.6436 
 (-0.29) (-0.49) (-0.33) (-0.95) (-0.91) (-0.42) (-0.94) (-0.82) 
SCHt 0.2740 0.2488 0.3541** 0.2739 -0.2886 -0.4084 -0.6014** -0.5029** 
 (1.41) (1.31) (2.11) (1.49) (-0.84) (-1.13) (-2.44) (-2.06) 
Inflt " -0.2285 
(-1.23) 
" " " " " " 
CSHIt " " 0.0151** 
(2.55) 
" " " " " 
Taxt " " " -0.6397* 
(-1.77) 
" " " " 
Instt " " " " -0.0229 
(-0.42) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " 0.1615 
(0.67) 
" " 
RQt " " " " " -0.0188 
(-0.12) 
" " 
ROAt " " " " " " 0.7519 
(0.49) 
" 
ROEt " " " " " " " 0.7844** 
(2.12) 
Wald X
2
 320.86 319.94 327.75 302.75 16.25 17.27 43.98 51.09 
Prob> X
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Observations 614 614 614 568 252 252 198 198 
Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP (i.e., 
Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for inflation, CSHI 
counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for the sum of the 
institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts for 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and 
return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient estimates and their t-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4a. Bayesian dynamic panel data estimations for 24 OECD countries, yearly data (1980-2012). 
 Basic model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
         
FDIt-1  0.2103 
(4.71) 
0.2244 
(4.85) 
0.3555 
(4.43) 
0.2217 
(4.22) 
0.2010 
(4.55) 
0.2819 
(4.04) 
0.2110 
(4.22) 
0.1103 
(4.42) 
GDPt 1.1055 
(3.14) 
1.1044 
(3.22) 
1.1038 
(3.31) 
1.1055 
(3.44) 
1.1156 
(3.48) 
1.0800 
(3.39) 
1.3201 
(3.12) 
1.0452 
(3.33) 
Trade/GDPt -0.302 
(-2.14) 
-0.0303 
(-2.21) 
0.0255 
(2.33) 
-0.0315 
(-2.76) 
-0.0311 
(-2.34) 
-0.0314 
(-2.28) 
-0.0352 
(-2.15) 
-0.0332 
(-2.17) 
ULCt -0.3531 
(-3.12) 
-0.2412 
(-3.17) 
-0.3316 
(-3.25) 
-0.3417 
(-3.14) 
-0.3316 
(-3.12) 
-0.3207 
(-3.15) 
-0.3341 
(-3.54) 
-0.3205 
(-3.21) 
SCHt 0.4567 
(4.03) 
0.4403 
(4.16) 
0.4235 
(4.13) 
0.4307 
(4.22) 
0.4108 
(4.16) 
0.4255 
(4.17) 
0.4103 
(4.08) 
0.4355 
(4.15) 
Inflt - -0.3305 
(-3.45) 
- - - - - - 
CSH It - - 0.0261 
(3.15) 
- - - - - 
Taxt - - - -0.7108 
(-5.08) 
- - - - 
Instt - - - - -0.0464 
(-5.16) 
- - - 
PSt - - - - - 0.2207 
(2.98) 
- - 
RQt - - - - - -0.0252 
(-3.44) 
- - 
ROAt - - - - - - 0.6312 
(4.15) 
- 
ROEt - - - - - - - 0.8503 
(4.07) 
         
         
Observations 614 614 614 568 252 252 198 198 
         
Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), Trade/GDP  counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP, ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH 
counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), Infl counts for inflation, CSH I counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, Tax for corporate tax rate, 
Inst counts for the sum of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the 
return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the posterior mean estimates and their z-statistics in the parentheses 
for the period 1980-2012.  
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Table 4b. Bayesian dynamic panel data estimations Greece, yearly data (1980-2012). 
 Basic model        
         
FDIt-1  0.4208 
(5.07) 
       
GDPt 1.076 
(3.41) 
       
Trade/GDPt -0.0353 
(-2.77) 
       
ULCt -0.0517 
(-5.332) 
       
SCHt 0.1504 
(6.20) 
       
Inflt -0.2015 
(-3.337) 
       
CSH It 0.027 
(3.387) 
       
Taxt -0.7154 
(-4.561) 
       
Instt -0.0355 
(-3.671) 
       
PSt 0.1302 
(3.331) 
       
RQt -0.0287 
(-2.887) 
       
ROAt 0.8105 
(4.605) 
       
ROEt 0.8103 
(2.998) 
       
         
         
Observations 614        
         
Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), Trade/GDP  counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP, ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH 
counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), Infl counts for inflation, CSH I counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, Tax for corporate tax rate, 
Inst counts for the sum of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the 
return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the posterior mean coefficient estimates and their z-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012.  
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Table 5. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data estimations for the high 
average FDI inflows sub group (8 OECD countries), yearly data (1980-2012). 
 
 Basic model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -9 7772*** -8.7233*** -10.8715*** -11.8128*** 0.3816 -5.6003 -2.6878 -4.5450 
 (-7.90) (-8.47) (-6.78) (-9.15) (0.07) (-1.42) (-0.48) (-0.97) 
FDIt-1 0.3330*** 0.3474*** 0.3214*** 0.3422*** 0.0200 0.0047 0.0498 0.0417 
 (4.92) (4.96) (4.59) (4.69) (0.08) (0.02) (0.27) (0.22) 
GDPt 3.1743*** 3.0232*** 3.3689*** 3.5728*** 1.6963 3.1379*** 1.7437 2.3062** 
 (10.42) (10.06) (9.06) (10.30) (1.50) (3.98) (1.40) (2.31) 
Trade/GDPt -0.2204 -0.1789 -0.2133 -0.1812 0.0565 -0.1525 -0.1680 -0.3429 
 (-1.17) (-0.90) (-1.14) (-0.94) (0.29) (-0.52) (-0.65) (-1.12) 
ULCt -1.5961*** -1.7677*** -1.7235*** -1.7876*** -1.5800*** -1 7998*** -0.3165 -0.7488 
 (-9.26) (-7.64) (-6.68) (-12.94) (-2.70) (-5.17) (-0.32) (-0.88) 
SCHt 0.3312* 0.1304 0.3576** 0.3119 -0.7236*** -0.7930*** -0.4151*** -0.4858*** 
 (1.73) (0.79) (2.31) (1.52) (-4.89) (-6.09) (-2.96) (-2.75) 
Inflt " -3.9395** 
(-2.20) 
" " " " " " 
CSHIt " " 0.0163* 
(1.91) 
" " " " " 
Taxt 
_
 
_
 
_
 1.1765*** 
(4.43) 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
Instt " " " " -0.1318** 
(-1.96) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " 0.1283 
(0.85) 
" " 
RQt " " " " " -0.7855** 
(-2.18) 
" " 
ROAt " " " " " " 13.7760 
(3.61) 
" 
ROEt " " " " " " " 1.4783*** 
(3.10) 
Wald X
2
 4416.13 875.06 2387.31 1733.43 151.49 377.38 120.02 305.88 
Prob> X
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 212 212 212 212 89 89 81 81 
Notes: The high average FDI inflows sub group consists of United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Canada, Spain 
and Netherlands. Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % 
of GDP (i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for 
inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for the sum 
of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts 
for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and 
return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient estimates and their t-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data estimations for the 
medium average FDI inflows sub group (8 OECD countries), yearly data (1980-
2012). 
 
 Basic        
 model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -2.9216 -2.9204 -3.0644 -1.0007 -3.4193 -0.0221 3.7431 3.7236 
 (-1.29) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-0.46) (-0.90) (-0.01) (1.06) (1.11) 
FDIW 0.4593*** 0.4586*** 0.4646*** 0.3670*** 0.1417 0.2077 0.1328 0.1273 
 (5.01) (5.00) (4.99) (3.84) (0.79) (1.53) (0.96) (0.97) 
GDPt 1.1037* 1.0911* 1.1041* 0.9025** 1.5336 0.5379 -0.3460 -0.4075 
 (1.79) (1.77) (1.78) (1.57) (1.35) (0.49) (-0.34) (-0.43) 
Trade/GDPt 0.0135 0.0173 0.0285 -0.1559 0.1087 0.0465 -0.5516 -0.5754 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) (-0.86) (0.19) (0.08) (-1.11) (-1.32) 
ULCt 0.1487 0.1936 0.1399 0.2023 0.4426 0.8114 1.8126* 1.9397* 
 (0.60) (0.70) (0.55) (0.80) (0.42) (0.85) (1.69) (1.86) 
SCHt 0.0661 0.0748 0.0663 -0.0237 0.4201 0.2031 -0.1916 -0.0372 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (-0.14) (0.64) (0.27) (-0.36) (-0.08) 
Inflt " 0.0841 
(0.74) 
" " " " " " 
CSH It " " 0.0050* 
(0.77) 
" " " " " 
Taxt " " " -1.6910*** 
(-5.01) 
" " " " 
Instt " " " " -3.4193 
(-0.90) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " 0.0286 
(0.06) 
" " 
RQt " " " " " -0.3162 
(-1.03) 
" " 
ROAt " " " " " " 5.3193 
(1.41) 
" 
ROEt 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 1.2212 
(1.62) 
Wald X
2
 416.60 576.26 607.10 1015.63 26.04 730.75 29.69 71.40 
Prob> X
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 202 202 202 186 80 80 58 58 
Notes: The medium average FDI inflows sub group consists of Australia, Mexico, Sweden, Italy, Ireland, Norway, Turkey and Austria 
Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of GDP (i.e., 
Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for inflation, CSHI 
counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for the sum of the 
institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts for 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and 
return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient estimates and their t-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel data estimations for the low 
average FDI inflows sub group (8 OECD countries), yearly data (1980-2012). 
 
 Basic        
 model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -1.9686 -2.0177 -2.2756 -2.4827 -1.9393 0.3755 -7.0360 -7.2791 
 (-1.09) (-1.07) (-1.34) (-0.73) (-0.23) (0.04) (-0.70) (-0.74) 
FDIt-1 0.4938*** 0.4889*** 0.4782*** 0.3782*** 0.3464* 0.3521* 0.0848 0.0883 
 (3.89) (3.97) (4.56) (3.18) (1.83) (1.94) (0.70) (0.71) 
GDPt 0.8403 0.9046* 0.8033 1.4060 1.3346 0.7527 3.0074 3.0176 
 (1.57) (1.66) (1.43) (1.62) (0.66) (0.35) (1.18) (1.20) 
Trade/GDPt -0.1195 -0.0753 0.0559 -0.5672 -0.4028 -0.4784 -1.1546* -1.1337* 
 (-0.32) (-0.24) (0.19) (-1.22) (-0.66) (-0.58) (-1.84) (-1.75) 
ULCt -0.0849 -0.2057 -0.0146 -0.7512*** -1.3882 -1.0435 -2.2322* -2.1786 
 (-0.28) (-0.66) (-0.04) (-3.33) (-1.59) (-0.84) (-1.65) (-1.61) 
SCHt 0.0888 -0.0050 0.0599 -0.0670 0.2370 -0.0933 0.0309 0.1040 
 (0.39) (-0.02) (0.23) (-0.32) (0.24) (-0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Inflt " -0.7490* 
(-1.69) 
" " " " " " 
CSH It 
_
 
_
 0.0138 
(1.39) 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
Taxt " " " -1.5842** 
(-2.39) 
" " " " 
Instt " " " " -0.0382 
(-0.98) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " -0.1020 
(-0.28) 
" " 
RQt " " " " " 0.0759 
(0.21) 
" " 
ROAt 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 -0.8709 
(-0.50) 
_
 
ROEt " " " " " " " 0.2308 
(0.26) 
Wald X
2
 476.90 2281.20 631.96 109.86 60.38 859.12 19.46 37.69 
Prob> X
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 200 200 200 170 83 83 59 59 
Notes: The low average FDI inflows sub group consists of Korea, Denmark, Japan, Portugal, Finland, New Zealand, Greece and 
Iceland. Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for exports plus imports as a % of 
GDP (i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for 
inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for the sum 
of the institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, PS counts 
for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and 
return on equity of the relative benchmark stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient estimates and their t-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel 
data estimations for 5 OECD countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain) yearly data (1980-2012). 
 
 Basic model Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq5 Eq6 Eq7 Eq8 
Constant -9.4812*** -9 3945*** -9.5072*** -8.7407*** -33.7248* -30.6895*** -18.8445** -16.5510** 
 (-10.27) (-8.98) (-9.27) (-31.24) (-1.70) (-3.40) (-2.36) (-2.05) 
FDIt-1 0.2627*** 0.2595*** 0.2624*** 0.2157*** -0.1328 -0.1030* -0.0677 -0.0410 
 (2.86) (2.92) (2.89) (2.50) (-1.04) (-1.80) (-0.81) (-0.49) 
GDPt 3.0470*** 2.9899*** 2 9959*** 3.0381*** 9.1153* 8.2669*** 5.9051*** 5.1394** 
 (8.95) (8.04) (8.48) (27.34) (1.82) (3.74) (2.94) (2.52) 
Trade/GDPt 0.1291 0.1394 0.1714 0.0212 -1.1804 -1.2184*** 0.3327 0.5155 
 (0.49) (0.53) (0.62) (0.08) (-1.31) (-3.59) (0.29) (0.44) 
ULCt -1.1840*** -1.0590*** -1.1506*** -1.3101*** -2.7020** -2.8595** -3.4962** -3.1302* 
 (-14.06) (-5.01) (-11.30) (-21.26) (-2.07) (-2.48) (-2.03) (-1.74) 
SCHt -0.0718 -0.0365 -0.1070 -0.0648 -0.3166 0.3830 0.2573 0.6046 
 (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-0.20) (0.51) (0.18) (0.41) 
Inflt " 0.5443 
(0.66) 
" " " " " " 
CSHIt " " 0.0087 
(1.35) 
" " " " " 
Taxt 
_
 
_
 
_
 -1.0329*** 
(-3.91) 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
Instt " " " " 0.2969 
(1.47) 
" " " 
PSt " " " " " 0.2682 
(0.92) 
" " 
RQt " " " " " 1.4428*** 
(4.89) 
" " 
ROAt 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 
_
 -9.3955* 
(-1.78) 
_
 
ROEt " " " " " " " -0.1104 
(-0.12) 
Wald X
2
 1135.41 1768.07 911.45 4345.47 11.05 73.85 56.59 11.96 
Prob> X
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Observations 134 134 134 134 52 52 38 38 
Notes: Notes: Notes: GDP counts for GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), TO counts for 
exports plus imports as a % of GDP (i.e., Trade/GDP), ULC counts for unit labor cost, SCH counts for 
school enrollment (secondary, % gross), INFL counts for inflation, CSHI counts for share of gross 
capital formation at current PPPs, TAX counts for corporate tax rate, INST counts for the sum of the 
institutional variables Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Control 
of Corruption, PS counts for Political Stability and Absence of Violence, RQ counts for Regulatory 
Quality and ROA and ROE count for the return on assets and return on equity of the relative benchmark 
stock market indices. The table presents the coefficient estimates and their t-statistics in the 
parentheses for the period 1980-2012. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
